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A B S T R A C T
This paper examines the feasibility of various alternative student loan schemes for Ireland. Using data from a
large employer survey, we model the life-cycle earnings distribution for Irish graduates. We then use these
estimates to simulate the effects of alternative types of student loans, including mortgage-type loans and income-
contingent loans of various designs, incorporating participation and migration patterns into the simulations. The
results show that mortgage-type loans entail unsustainably high repayment rates for low income graduates.
Through the specification of several alternative income-contingent loan schemes, it is demonstrated that this
approach to higher education financing is feasible both in terms of affordability for graduates and with respect to
implied government subsidies. There are some important policy design issues to be addressed and we conclude
with some recommendations for a future Irish scheme.
1. Introduction
The Irish higher education system is currently financed by a com-
bination of direct government funding and student fees. Unusually
among OECD countries, the fee component is not accompanied by a
student loan scheme, which has led to growing concerns about re-
strictions on access and hardship for students’ families. Moreover, an
increase in the fee level is being considered as a solution to substantial
underfunding of the higher education system. In this context, the gov-
ernment is currently considering the introduction of a student loan
scheme. The aim of this paper is to assess the feasibility of various al-
ternative schemes in terms of concerns about both affordability for
graduates and the consequences for public finances.
In conceptual and policy terms there is a consensus that government
intervention is required in the financing of higher education. Such in-
tervention can take the form of provision of a taxpayer funded system
and/or government-backed student loans. Student loan schemes exist in
many countries, and can be broadly broken into two types. The first
entails a mortgage-type loan, which is either provided directly or
guaranteed by the government, and has the main feature that graduates
repay the amount borrowed over a fixed time period. An alternative
approach is an income-contingent loan (ICL) system, which has been
adopted in several countries as an alternative to mortgage-type loans.
The critical feature of an ICL is that borrowers repay their debt only
once their incomes surpass a given threshold, with the size and duration
of repayments beyond this depending on the borrower's income.
Although student loans are available in many countries, there are
several reasons for concern about the feasibility of introducing student
loans in Ireland, and these are discussed in the context of the history
and policy environment of Irish higher education funding in Section 2.
Section 3 outlines the econometric approach taken to simulating the
earnings distribution for Irish graduates; it also describes the data and
reports the disaggregated estimations of life-cycle earnings profiles for
Irish female and male graduates. These estimates are then used to si-
mulate the effects of mortgage-type loan schemes on repayment bur-
dens, with results being presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5
uses the same estimated earnings profiles to simulate the likely col-
lection experience of ICLs of various designs to illustrate the afford-
ability of such approaches from the perspective of both graduates and
public finance subsidies. Section 6 concludes.
2. Irish higher education funding and the Irish policy context
Before 1996, Irish university students paid tuition fees that were
substantial relative to typical incomes at the time; in 1996, fees were
about €2000 per annum at a time when average annual industrial
earnings were about €18,000. These costs were mitigated by a system of
‘student grants’ that paid the fees (and some maintenance payments) for
the children of families whose income was low enough to qualify. The
proportion of university students in receipt of grants varied over the
years, but an indicative figure is provided by McCoy, Calvert, Smyth,
and Darmody (2009), who report that it was 63% in 1992.
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Student fees were abolished in 1996, at which point only a ‘student
contribution’ of €191 was payable towards non-tuition costs such as
examinations. The stated aim of this reform was to improve access to
higher education for students from low income families. However, since
such students already qualified for student grants, a positive effect
seemed unlikely and in fact Denny (2014) found that the socio-eco-
nomic gradient in higher education attendance was unaffected by the
abolition of fees.
The student contribution was gradually increased over the years and
by 2008, it was €900. However, during and after the Great Recession in
2008/2009, dramatic increases were imposed, with the contribution
rising by €500 per year until it reached €3000 in 2014. These fees are
payable by about 50% of students, with the fees of those from low-
income backgrounds waived.
It is important to understand the economic background to this re-
versal away from ‘free’ higher education. Ireland was one of the
countries worst affected by the Great Recession, with output falling by
over 10% in real terms between 2008 and 2010 and unemployment
rising from 5.0% in late 2007 to 13.2% in late 2009, eventually peaking
at 15.2% in early 2012. The effects of the global recession felt else-
where were compounded in Ireland by the bursting of a property
bubble and the collapse of Irish banks, whose debts the government had
earlier guaranteed. The government deficit rose from almost zero in
2008 to 13.9% in 2010 and a remarkable 30.8% in 2011, when banking
losses crystallised. As a result, the government undertook a severe
programme of austerity measures, combining tax increases and ex-
penditure cuts.
The increased fee income from students allowed the government to
reduce its expenditure on higher education during the years of most
severe fiscal pressure. As well as transferring some of its expenditure on
higher education to students themselves, the government also further
reduced its funding of the sector at a time when student numbers in-
creased substantially: between 2008 and 2015, total university income
(including the increased student contribution) fell by 8% while student
numbers rose by 14%, leading to core income per student falling by
22%. The state contribution fell by a remarkable 38.4% over this
period. This sustained reduction in funding of higher education over
several years has led to widespread recognition that funding must be
increased if quality is not to deteriorate significantly
(Expert Group, 2015).
Apart from increased funding per student being necessary, demo-
graphic patterns indicate that total funding would have to increase for
many years to come even if funding per student were to be held con-
stant: the number of students completing second level education is not
projected to peak until 2029, when there will be 27% more school-
leavers than there are at present. With a participation rate of 18–20
year olds in higher education of 58%, such demographic growth clearly
has significant implications for future funding needs if current partici-
pation rates are to be maintained.
Because of significant tax increases during the crisis, there is little
political or popular enthusiasm for increased funding coming from
general taxation. On the other hand, increasing the student contribution
further under the current system is expected to be difficult. Although
student grants – and a waiver of the student contribution – are available
for about 50% of students, for the remainder, the fee component is
already believed to be causing hardship for many families
(Amárach Consulting, 2015). This hardship would clearly increase if
the student contribution were to be increased. As a result, serious
consideration is currently being given to the introduction of a system of
student loans. The government appointed an Expert Group on the Fu-
ture Funding of Higher Education, whose report recommended the in-
troduction of an ICL system as one of three possible options
(Expert Group, 2016).1
In the discussion of ICLs in Ireland, two main objections are com-
monly raised. First, because of the ongoing precarious position of the
public finances, the possibility that a large proportion of the student
loan book might not be repaid would be problematic. Moreover, the lag
in repayments implied by a student loan scheme is of concern, given
legal constraints on government borrowing implied by the EU Fiscal
Treaty by which Ireland is bound. Second, the economic crisis is be-
lieved to have affected the young particularly badly, and the idea that
young graduates would be further burdened with student debt is re-
garded by many as unfair. We detail these two concerns in turn below.
ICLs operate in several countries, including Australia, England, New
Zealand and Hungary. In those countries, the size of the government
subsidy varies widely across countries as well as over time. Shen and
Ziderman (2009) report ‘hidden grants’ in these systems that vary from
about 12% in the English scheme as it operated at the time to about
26% in Australia; the reforms to the English system introduced in 2012
raised projections of the government subsidy to 43% according to
Crawford, Crawford, and Jin (2014). Some of the subsidy arises because
of interest charges being below the cost of government borrowing; this
is a policy decision and can be controlled by policy makers to a large
extent. The remainder of the subsidy arises from non-repayment of
loans, which in turn arises because of graduates having low earnings
and because of non-repayment by emigrants. These factors are less
amenable to control by policy makers, and thus need to be assessed in
advance of the introduction of an ICL.
There is good reason for concern about the possibility of high rates
of non-repayment due to low earnings. A recent paper by Collins (2016)
showed that 12.6% of employed Irish graduates are on ‘low pay’, de-
fined as lower than a ‘living wage’ of €11.45 per hour. This may be
explained by a particularly high level of over-education in Ireland:
McGuinness, Bergin, and Whelan (2015) conclude that 33% of gradu-
ates working full-time in Ireland are over-educated, the highest level of
the 26 European countries included in their analysis, and significantly
higher than the (unweighted) cross-country average of 18%.
In addition to concern about low graduate pay, emigration is a
particular concern in Ireland. Reports for recent cohorts of graduates
indicate a high level of graduate emigration, with 12% of those grad-
uating with primary degrees from Irish universities in 2013 working
abroad nine months after graduating. This was a significant increase
from the rate of 5% in 2006, but lower than the 17% recorded in 1986,
during the prolonged downturn of the 1980s (HEA, 2008; HEA, 2014).
As regards broader graduate emigration, the OECD has estimated
(Arslan et al., 2014) that the high-skilled emigration rate for Ireland is
about 20%, which is much higher than in the UK (11%), New Zealand
(9%) or Australia (3%), all countries for which graduate emigration has
posed challenges for the implementation of ICLs. However, little is
known about the duration of emigrating graduates’ stays or the pro-
portion that emigrate permanently, which makes it difficult to assess
the implications of emigration for repayments.
As well as fiscal considerations regarding the introduction of an ICL,
the effect on young graduates of loan repayments is a further important
consideration. Many of the austerity measures introduced during the
crisis period affected the young particularly strongly. The unemploy-
ment assistance payment was reduced for young claimants (aged
18–25) by over 50%; these cuts were in addition to the general cuts to
social welfare payments. Pay was cut by 10% for new entrants to public
sector employment on top of substantial pay cuts that had already been
applied to all public sector workers. A hiring ban was introduced in the
public sector in order to reduce public sector employment, which par-
ticularly affected the employment opportunities of young graduates. As
a result of these policy decisions, as well as the poor state of the labour
market, starting salaries for graduates fell by almost 12% between their
1 The other options were a return to ‘free fees’ and the continuation of the
(footnote continued)
current system.
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peak in 2007 and 2012, bringing salaries back to below 2004 levels
(Conefrey & Smith, 2014). In addition, unemployment rose from 8% to
29% for 20–24 year olds, the age group into which most new graduates
fall. Emigration has also been substantial, with the
European Commission (2013) estimating that the population of 15–24
year old Irish nationals fell by 9% between 2007 and 2012.
The effects of recent developments in the housing market on young
people have also attracted much comment. In 2015, the Central Bank of
Ireland introduced new mortgage rules that mean that first time buyers
must save substantial deposits (10–20% of the purchase price) before
being able to buy. This coincided with a rapid increase in rents and
wage stagnation, which has made such saving very difficult, and the
public perception is that young people are being prevented from en-
tering the property market. In a country that has traditionally had a
high home-ownership rate – among Irish nationals, it is 74% – this is
regarded as unfair.2
For all these reasons, particular attention must be paid to choosing
scheme parameters that make repayments affordable to graduates while
still yielding a reasonably high repayment rate to the government if a
loan scheme is to be politically feasible in Ireland. Thus, one of the main
aims of this paper is to compare mortgage-type loan and ICL schemes
and to compare alternative parameters for these schemes.
There is one existing study that models an ICL for Ireland (Flannery
& O'Donoghue, 2011), comparing an ICL with a graduate tax from both
fiscal and redistributional points of view. The methodology and data
used differ from our analysis as the authors obtain their graduate
earnings profiles from an Irish microsimulation model based on data
from the Living in Ireland Survey, which was the Irish component of the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) that ran from 1994 to
2001.3 The authors model an ICL scheme entailing a loan of €10,000
repaid at a rate of 10% on marginal earnings over a threshold of
€35,000 and 15% for earnings over €42,000; they model two interest
rate scenarios – one with a zero real rate, and another with a 2% real
rate. Under this scheme design and assuming that emigrating graduates
repay 40% of their debt, the average subsidy is 25% if a positive interest
rate is charged, and 40% if not. The analysis of the repayment patterns
of the graduates is somewhat unclear, however, with no explicit ana-
lysis of repayment burdens. In the analysis described in Section 5
below, we vary the parameters of the ICL loan scheme and pay parti-
cular attention to various measures of affordability as well as the size of
the fiscal subsidy.
3. Simulating the graduate earnings distribution
To conduct the analysis of alternative schemes, we model life-cycle
earnings across the Irish graduate earnings distribution using
Unconditional Quantile Regression and 2006 data from the National
Employment Survey (NES). The NES collects payroll records on earn-
ings and hours of work from a large sample of firms with three or more
employees. The sample is selected in proportion to the numbers of firms
registered in each sector and size class (CSO, 2007).4 These payroll data
are augmented with information on the personal characteristics of a
sample of those employed by each of the surveyed firms. An advantage
of the NES is the sample size: 67,700 employees in 4800 firms were
surveyed, including about 8500 Irish graduates aged 25–55. A further
advantage is the lack of measurement error in the earnings data. NES
surveys were carried out in 2003, 2006 (twice) and annually from 2007
to 2009, at which point they ceased because of government funding
cutbacks. Thus, their disadvantage is that they are not current.5
We chose to use the 2006 data for our analysis for two reasons. First,
data from 2008 and 2009 are likely to be unrepresentative of the Irish
labour market, given that wage cuts were very common in those crisis
years (Doris, O'Neill, & Sweetman, 2015), particularly for older and
better-paid workers. In the choice between 2006 and 2007, we took
into account the evidence that mean starting graduate earnings in 2006
were closest to those in 2015.6 However, we acknowledge that even if
mean starting salaries in 2006 and 2015 do turn out to be similar, the
economic crisis may have caused permanent changes in remuneration
patterns that resulted in permanent changes in the variance of graduate
earnings and in life-cycle earnings profiles. For this reason, our esti-
mates should be treated as indicative.
It is worth noting that there would be reasons for caution even if our
data were very recent: simulations of lifecycle graduate earnings dis-
tributions that use cross-section data are based on the implicit as-
sumption that future earnings of current cohorts will follow the same
pattern as those of previous cohorts. However, as is well known from
the literature on the labour market assimilation of immigrants (e.g.
Borjas, 1985), predicting wage growth over time using a cross-section
of workers may lead to biased estimates if the average quality of suc-
cessive cohorts of workers is changing. If the ability levels of Irish
graduates have been falling over time, this will lead to an upward bias
in the slope of estimated age profiles.
It is plausible that the average ability of university graduates has
decreased over time, since the proportion of 25–34 year olds in Ireland
with a university-level qualification increased from about 14% in 1996
to about 40% in 2015 (OECD, 1998, 2016). Indeed, O'Connell, Clancy,
and McCoy (2006) found that the prior academic achievement of HE
entrants declined between 1998 and 2004, over which period the ad-
mission rate increased rapidly, from 44% to 55%. On the other hand,
OECD estimates of the internal rate of return to university-level edu-
cation have shown the return increasing between 1994 and 2013
(OECD, 1997, 2017),7 which might not be expected if the average
quality of graduates were declining. It may be that any bias generated
by declining average ability is being offset by other features of the
graduate labour market, in which case using cross-section data to es-
timate lifecycle earnings is reasonable.
To assess the effects of different loan arrangements, we need to
estimate lifecycle earnings profiles at various parts of the distribution;
this will be of particular importance for the welfare of those in the
bottom parts of the graduate earnings distribution. The method usually
used for estimating the effects of variables at points of the distribution
other than the mean is quantile regression. Standard quantile regression
estimates the effects of variables on the conditional distribution of the
outcome variable, but this is not what is of interest here. Rather, we are
interested in the effect of age on unconditional earnings.
2 An editorial in the Irish Independent newspaper (‘Mortgage Rules are Very
Unfair to Young People’, March 2016) is typical of the media discussion of this
point.
3 Although the earnings projections are obtained from this micro-simulation
model, labour market participation responses are not simulated.
4 Although the CSO ensures that the firms sampled are representative in
terms of sector and size class, no information is available on the proportion of
employees excluded by the requirement to have at least three employees. CSO
business demography figures indicate that approximately 20% of Irish em-
ployment is in enterprises with less than 10 employees, but more detailed
breakdowns by firm size and graduate employment are not available.
5 The most up-to-date Irish data set containing earnings data is the EU-SILC
(Survey of Income and Living Conditions) and initially we attempted to conduct
our analysis with these data. However, there were too few observations to es-
timate earnings profiles with any precision.
6 Information on starting salaries is contained in annual surveys conducted by
the Higher Education Authority. Conefrey and Smith (2014) use this informa-
tion to calculate mean starting salaries for graduates in the years from
2004–2012 and report that the 2006 mean was just under €26,000, while the
2007 mean was about €27,000. The mean then fell in 2008 and 2009, settling at
about €24,000 from 2009–2012. More recent HEA surveys indicate that starting
salaries have been growing moderately since then (HEA, 2015, 2017). On this
basis, we conclude that the mean starting salary in 2015 was close to that in
2006.
7 From 14 to 21% for men and from 17 to 20% for women.
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Various methods have been used to ‘back out’ the unconditional
effects. The method we use is one proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and
Lemieux (2009) and used, for example, in Chapman and Liu (2013).
This method transforms the dependent variable using a Re-centred In-
fluence Function (RIF) transformation, and then regresses the trans-
formed dependent variable on the independent variables using OLS. For
the τth quantile, qτ= +Y q F q D Y q f qRIF( ; , ) ( ( ))/ ( )Y Y
where Y is income, D is an indicator function, and FY and fY are the
cumulative and marginal density functions respectively; the latter is
estimated using the kernel density estimator.8
To model the distribution of earnings in sufficient detail, we estimate
the relationship between age and earnings for 19 quantiles (from the 5th
to the 95th) separately for men and women of Irish nationality aged
25–55. Descriptive statistics for the sample used are reported in Table A1
of Appendix A. The relationship between age and earnings is allowed to be
fully flexible for each quantile; the final specifications vary between men
and women and between quantiles. A quartic specification performs best
for all quantiles of the female distribution up to the 85th, which probably
reflects a reduction in hours worked during the child-rearing years. For
men, a quartic specification is best up to the 35th quantile, but for higher
quantiles, cubic and quadratic specifications are preferred. For each
quantile, the parameter estimates are used to predict earnings at each year
of age from 21 to 66 for each of the 19 quantiles, thus yielding a detailed
picture of the entire distribution of life-cycle earnings.9
Once the quantiles of the lifetime earnings distribution have been si-
mulated, annual productivity growth of 1% across the distribution is as-
sumed, and the earnings profiles adjusted accordingly. This is similar to
the 1.1% per annum baseline growth rate assumed for the UK in
Crawford et al. (2014), but lower than the 2% per annum rate of pro-
ductivity growth assumed in Flannery and O'Donoghue (2011) for Ireland.
The resulting simulated life-cycle earnings profiles for various
quantiles of the distribution are shown in Fig. 1 for males and females
respectively. These are the basis for the analysis in the remainder of the
paper. A striking feature of these earnings profiles is the sharp reduction
in earnings for most quantiles for ages beyond the late fifties for men,
and beyond the early fifties for women. It is likely that these patterns
reflect the labour supply behaviour of the particular cohorts of gradu-
ates of these ages rather than reductions in hourly wage rates, and given
changes to pension arrangements in recent years,10 it is not clear that
such patterns will apply to recent graduates. However, as the results
below show, this is not of concern as the vast majority of graduates will
have paid their loans off before reaching these ages.
4. Results for Ireland: mortgage-type loans
Mortgage-type loans would, if introduced in Ireland, allow the
government to raise tuition fees while avoiding the negative effects on
higher education access caused by up-front charges. However, repay-
ment of mortgage-type loans can cause problems for borrowers, since
repayments are based on time rather than capacity to pay and so are
associated with both financial hardships and default risk. Default causes
damage to a graduate's credit reputation and thus eligibility for other
loans, such as for a home mortgage (Barr, 2001; Chapman, 2006).
Repayment burdens (RBs), defined as the proportion of income
accounted for by loan repayments, are the critical issue associated with
mortgage-type loans because the higher is the proportion of a graduate's
income that needs to be allocated to the repayment of a loan, the higher
default probabilities and the more likely is repayment hardship. RBs for
mortgage-type loans are unique for each individual borrower and can
be well over 100% for very low income debtors.
In this section we discuss the RB results for mortgage-type loans of
several specifications. The primary loan amount considered is €16,000.
This is equivalent to €4000 per year for a four-year degree, which would
entail a €1000 increase in annual fees from the current level. In fact, the
Irish system includes both three and four year degrees for historical rea-
sons, with about half of each intake of students undertaking four year
degrees.11 However, accounting fully for different degree lengths in the
analysis is not possible as it would require knowledge of where in the
earnings distribution graduates with different degree lengths lie, which
information is not available. To give an indication of the effect of a
mortgage-type loan on graduates from three year degree programmes, we
also provide analysis for a loan of €12,000. To assess the sensitivity of RBs
to policy variables, we further allow repayment schedules to vary in terms
of both the repayment start dates (two and five years after graduation) and
loan term (10 and 15 years). In each case, the interest rate is set at a real
rate of 2% per annum.
Table 1 provides mean and maximum RBs for working men and
women and for the mortgage-type loan variations described above. In
all variations analysed, the maximum RB is the one that applies in the
first year of repayments, while the mean RB is averaged over all years of
repayments. The first panel of the table shows results for the base case.
For both women and men, the average RB is particularly high for the
bottom decile of the lifecycle earnings distribution, being between 20
and 23%. Of particular concern are the maximum RBs that apply to the
bottom three deciles; these are all greater than 20% and reach 83% for
men in the bottom decile. The high RBs that apply to these lower deciles
are clearly illustrated in Fig. 2 for men and women respectively. They
show that while RBs for all workers – male and female – are below 10%
by the 8th year of repayments, there is substantial variation in RBs in
the 3–4 years after repayments start (5–6 years post-graduation). It is at
this early stage in their working lives that graduates with mortgage-
type loans are most vulnerable to hardship and default.
Of course, with a mortgage-type loan, the size of the loan is critical
for the repayment burden, since the repayment period is fixed. RB
figures for a €12,000 loan, shown in the second panel of Table 1, are
therefore uniformly lower than those for the higher loan amount.
However, for the bottom decile, mean RBs are still over 15%, while
maximum RBs range from 54 to 62%.
The third and fourth panels of Table 1 vary the repayment schedules
of the mortgage-type loan. The third panel shows results for a 15 year
repayment term, illustrating the extent to which spreading repayments
over a longer period reduces RBs. The fourth panel shows that if the
repayment start date is extended to five years after graduation, this also
reduces RBs substantially. This is, of course, because of the steepness of
the age-earnings profile in the early years of post-graduation work.
It is interesting to note that in each mortgage-type loan variation
shown in Table 1, mean and maximum RBs are lower for women in the
bottom half of the female lifecycle earnings distribution than for com-
parable men. This is due to the fact that earnings early in the lifecycle
are typically higher for women, with correspondingly lower RBs.
However, their age-earnings profiles are much flatter, so that by the end
of the repayment period, the RBs women face are higher.8 The estimator is implemented using the rifreg command in Stata, provided
by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009).
9 All regressions are weighted using the weights provided by the CSO, which
calibrate the survey responses to the totals from the Quarterly National
Household Survey by sector, occupation, full/part-time status, age group and
sex; see Central Statistics Office (2007).
10 Defined benefit private sector pension schemes are now mostly closed to
new entrants, and the age of entitlement to the state pension has increased from
65 to 66 and will increase further to 68 by 2028.
11 Some degrees entail five and six years of study (for example, Medicine and
Architecture), but the numbers are small. In addition, some students fail to
progress at the end of some year of their degree, particularly at the end of the
first year, and are required to repeat the year, which lengthens the time-to-
degree. Mooney, Patterson, O'Connor, and Chantler (2010) report that 3% of
students are repeating their year of study at any given point.
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We next estimate the proportion of graduates for whom the repay-
ment burden is problematically high. Here, we adopt the Baum and
Schwartz (2006) definition of an RB as ‘excessively high’ if it exceeds
18% of gross income. We assume that graduates must repay over a fixed
time period, and are not allowed to defer repayments if they are not
working. In order to implement this, we need to consider those who are
not in employment, for whom RBs will obviously be excessive, as well
as the RB figures for employees given in Table 1. We therefore calculate
employment rates by year of age separately for male and female
graduates using the EU-SILC data mentioned in Section 3 above.12
These employment rates are given in Table A2 of Appendix A.
The patterns shown in these employment data indicate that women
have higher rates of participation than men when they are young,
perhaps due to fewer women pursuing postgraduate study. However, 10
years after graduation, men's employment rates exceed women's and
remain higher thereafter. Nevertheless, women's employment rates re-
main above 80% until women are aged 37, at which stage they begin to
drop steadily. It should be noted that using the employment rates of
women currently aged over 40 is likely to underestimate the future
employment levels of current university students if female participation
rates continue to increase. However, it is employment rates at young
ages that are of most concern in the present exercise, since this is when
the bulk of repayments of student loans (whether a mortgage-type loan
or an ICL) are made.
Adding the proportion of graduates not employed in the years
during which repayments are required to the proportion of working
graduates experiencing RBs of greater than 18% during those years
yields the probabilities of excessively high RBs shown in Table 2.
The results of the first panel of Table 2 show that for the base case,
in the first year in which repayments are due, a large majority of
graduates – 70% of males and 67% of females – face excessively high
RBs. Income growth ensures that this proportion falls in subsequent
years but even after five years, over a quarter of graduates face such
high RBs. Even if those not working are allowed to defer their loans, the
proportion of graduates with excessively high RBs lies between 10 and
40% for women in the first three years of repayments, and between 20
and 35% for men in those years. It seems highly unlikely that these RBs
would be seen as fair; moreover they imply the strong likelihood of
many graduates experiencing consumption hardship, with a proportion
of these being forced to default. The subsequent panels illustrate the
effect of reducing the size of the loan, spreading repayments over more
years, and delaying the start of repayments. Reflecting the results in
Table 1, these policy choices do indeed mitigate the high RBs observed
in the base case. Nevertheless, excessive RBs continue to be prevalent
for a substantial minority even in these cases.
Table 1
Mortgage-type loan repayment burdens as percentage of net income, selected
percentiles of lifecycle earnings distribution, varying terms and loan amounts,
2% real interest rate.
10th 20th 30th 50th 70th 80th
Base case: €16,000 loan, 10 year term, repayments begin 2 years after
graduation
Females
Mean 20.0 11.2 9.4 6.5 5.4 4.8
Maximum 72.7 29.9 23.6 10.7 7.3 6.6
Males
Mean 23.4 16.3 9.7 6.3 4.6 4.1
Maximum 82.6 53.7 22.1 8.8 5.8 5.1
€12,000 loan, 10 year term, repayments begin 2 years after
graduation
Females
Mean 15.0 8.4 7.0 4.9 4.1 3.6
Maximum 54.5 22.4 17.7 8.0 5.5 4.9
Males
Mean 17.5 12.2 7.2 4.7 3.4 3.1
Maximum 62.0 40.2 16.6 6.6 4.3 3.8
€16,000 loan, 15 year term, repayments begin 2 years after
graduation
Females
Mean 11.5 6.8 5.8 4.2 3.5 3.2
Maximum 53.1 21.8 17.2 7.8 5.4 4.8
Males
Mean 12.7 9.0 5.7 4.0 3.0 2.7
Maximum 60.3 39.2 16.2 6.4 4.2 3.7
€16,000 loan, 10 year term, repayments begin 5 years after
graduation
Females
Mean 10.0 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.1 4.6
Maximum 17.1 11.1 10.1 7.6 6.4 5.7
Males
Mean 10.4 8.0 6.7 5.7 4.4 3.9
Maximum 21.9 15.8 10.8 7.6 5.5 4.9
Median shown in bold.
Fig. 1. Simulated life-cycle earnings profiles.
12 Recall that the NES data cover employees only and so cannot be used to
estimate employment rates.
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5. Results for Ireland: ICL
Having established that a mortgage-type loan would entail RBs that are
problematic for individual graduates, we now turn to modelling several
alternative ICL schemes, which are designed to limit RBs to affordable le-
vels. There are several parameters of ICL loan schemes that affect personal
affordability and the size of the government subsidy. These include the
earnings threshold; whether repayments are levied on total or marginal
income once the threshold is reached; the rate(s) at which repayments are
levied; what, if any, real interest rate is charged; whether the interest rate is
charged in all years in which debt is held, only in post-graduation years, or
only in years in which earnings exceed the threshold; and whether out-
standing debts are written off at some age, typically 55 or 60.
We experimented with a broad range of scheme parameters. It
quickly became apparent that a relatively low earnings threshold
should be used, as otherwise graduates in low earnings quantiles repay
a very low proportion of their loans. The earnings threshold is therefore
set at €26,000.13 In addition, because of the shapes of the age-earnings
profiles reported in Section 3, introducing a write-off age made no
difference; loans had either been paid off by age 55, or earnings had
fallen below the threshold at that stage.
When we experimented with a positive real interest rate of 2%
charged in all years after graduation, repayments were found to be
strongly regressive; those from higher earnings quantiles repaid less
than those from lower earnings quantiles. This would be regarded as a
very unattractive feature of an ICL scheme if introduced in Ireland,
particularly considering the fact that students whose parents have low
incomes pay no fees in the present Irish system, leading to strong
progressivity in terms of parental income (but not necessarily graduate
income). To avoid regressivity, we therefore model two alternative
interest rate regimes, one entailing a zero real rate of interest, and the
other rising to a 2% real rate of interest in periods when income rises
above the €26,000 threshold, but zero otherwise; hence no interest is
charged prior to graduation.
Two repayment schedules are modelled to reflect the variations that
exist in countries that have ICL schemes. In most countries, collection is
based on a marginal rate only on income above the earnings threshold;
in contrast, the Australian system collects a percentage of total income
once that threshold has been reached. Depending on the income bases
used – whether marginal or total – the rates also differ. For example, in
Australia, repayments are calculated as between 4 and 8% of total in-
come, whereas in England and Wales, repayments are calculated as 9%
of marginal income and in New Zealand, the rate is 12% of marginal
income.
The first repayment schedule modelled here entails a flat rate of 8%
on marginal income above the threshold. The second entails rates of
2–8% on total income once the threshold is reached, starting at 2% and
rising in increments of 1% for every €5000 of additional earnings over
€26,000 up to 8% on earnings above €56,000.14 The loan amount is
Fig. 2. Mortgage-type loan repayment burdens for employees, various quantiles of the earnings distribution, €16,000 loan, repayments begin 2 years after graduation.
Table 2
Probabilities of RBs in excess of 18% of gross income.
Years after repayments begin
1 2 3 5 10
Base case: €16,000 loan, 10 year term, repayments begin 2 years after
graduation
Females 0.67 0.43 0.27 0.25 0.15
Males 0.70 0.60 0.43 0.28 0.12
€12,000 loan, 10 year term, repayments begin 2 years after graduation
Females 0.57 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.15
Males 0.70 0.60 0.38 0.28 0.12
€16,000 loan, 15 year term, repayments begin 2 years after graduation
Females 0.57 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.15
Males 0.65 0.55 0.38 0.23 0.12
€16,000 loan, 10 year term, repayments begin 5 years after graduation
Females 0.26 0.30 0.15 0.14 0.18
Males 0.32 0.28 0.22 0.13 0.04
13 This is the 2006 mean annual average starting salary in the HEA graduate
earnings survey (HEA, 2008).
14 To be precise, details of the two scheme types are as follows. For the
scheme with repayments based on marginal income:
= >< >R Y if B Y and YB if B Y and Y
if Y
0.08( 26) 0.08( 26) 26
0.08( 26) 26
0 26
where R is the annual repayment in thousands of euro, Y is annual earnings in
thousands of euro and B is the size of the outstanding loan balance, also in
thousands of euro. For the scheme with repayments based on total income:
=
+ + < + +>< + + < +< >R
x Y if x Y x and B x Y
Y if Y and B Y
B if B x Y and x Y x
B if B Y and Y
if Y
(0.02 0.01 ) (26 5 ) (31 5 ) (0.02 0.01 )
0.08 56 0.08
(0.02 0.01 ) (26 5 ) (31 5 )
0.08 56
0 26
for = …x 0, 1, ,5.
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again assumed to be €16,00015 and graduates are eligible to start re-
paying their loans immediately on graduation.
Tables 3 and 4 show results for working females and males respec-
tively. The four panels of the tables apply to the four alternative specifi-
cations of the ICL scheme. The columns show the results for various
quantiles of the distribution, with the column for median earnings high-
lighted in bold. The rows in each panel represent various indicators of
affordability – absolute monthly and total repayments, repayments as a
percentage of net earnings, and total repayments discounted at a rate of
2% per annum. Years of repayment and age of final repayment are also
included to allow comparison with the mortgage-type loans discussed in
Section 4 for which the years of repayment are set at 10 (or 15) and the
age of final repayment for our hypothetical graduates is set at 32 (or 37).
For female workers, the proportion who pay off their loans in full
depends on the particular scheme design; schemes with repayments
that are based on marginal income generate a lower degree of full re-
payment, with the bottom 15% of lifecycle earners failing to pay in full,
whereas the bottom 10% of earners fail to pay in full in schemes with
repayments based on total income. For all schemes, the number of years
for which repayments are made declines as the earnings quantile in-
creases, so the higher the earnings, the more quickly and the earlier in
life they are paid off in full. Similarly, while repayments are being
made, average monthly repayments both while graduates are in their
twenties and over all repayment years are higher for those in higher
lifecycle earnings quantiles.
The percentage of net income that is accounted for by repayments –
the net RB – ranges from 1.5 to 6.3%; for those in the bottom half of the
lifecycle earnings distribution, the maximum net RB is 6.1%. These
compare favourably to the much higher RBs implied by the mortgage-
type loan scheme described in Section 4 above. RBs are clearly higher in
panels C and D, which describe results for schemes with repayments
based on total income. However, the loans are also fully repaid more
quickly for these ICL versions.
Considering the total amounts repaid, for variations that entail a zero
real interest rate, there is no difference across the earnings distribution.
However, for the two schemes that entail a positive real rate of interest
(Panels A and C), total repayments are lower for higher life-cycle earnings
quantiles, because interest payments are lower. However, this apparent
regressivity of repayments is reversed when total repayments are dis-
counted by 2%. In this case, the fact that those at lower quantiles repay
their loans later in their working lives leads to those repayments being
discounted more heavily, and so discounted repayments being progressive.
This progressivity of total discounted repayments is also evident in Panels
B and D, which entail zero real interest rates.
Results for male workers, reported in Table 4, show similar results
as for women in many respects. However, for all ICL versions, only the
bottom 5% of earners fail to pay off their loans in full, compared to the
10–15% that applies to women. This is the result of men having steeper
age-earnings profiles, so that even those at lower quantiles reach the
earnings threshold for enough years to make repayments in full. The
fact that the simulated earnings profiles for men are steeper than for
women also leads to the RBs for men being higher, lying between 2.9%
and 8.6% of net income for the quantiles shown. Of course, the faster
rate of repayment also leads to men making repayments for fewer years
than women.16 Once again, total discounted repayments are
progressive in the sense that they increase as the position in the life-
cycle earnings distribution improves.
Tables 3 and 4 apply to those graduates who work in every year and
so take no account of two crucial elements that determine ICL repay-
ments: employment and emigration. It is important to note that a year
of non-employment or of emigration does not cause a permanent non-
repayment, but rather a delay of one year. Thus, non-employment and
temporary emigration reduce the net present value of total repayments.
In implementing the modification of the repayment patterns caused
by employment rates of below 100%, we assume that years of non-
employment are experienced randomly; this imposes the assumption
that in any year, each graduate has a fixed probability of working given
by the sample employment rates obtained from EU-SILC 2006 data
shown in Table A2. This is certainly an over-simplification, since a year
of non-work is more likely to be experienced by those with lower
earnings, and is likely to be correlated with non-participation in sub-
sequent years. However, in the absence of panel data of sufficient
length to estimate covariances of employment periods, this is the best
that can be achieved.
It is important to note that there is no behavioural content in this
analysis – current employment rates are used only to adjust for the
proportion of total loans repaid. Since loan repayments reduce net
earnings, it is possible that ICL schemes have negative effects on labour
supply, which would imply a higher degree of non-repayment than
predicted using current participation rates. Such incentive effects are
more likely for low-earning graduates and for women. However, since
ICL schemes are typically introduced at a national level, the separation
of labour supply effects from longer-run trends is difficult empirically.
However, on the above issue, Chapman and Leigh (2009) in-
vestigate behavioural effects of the marked discontinuity in net earn-
ings induced by the earnings threshold in the Australian system. They
find that graduates subject to loan repayments are indeed more likely to
take advantage of work-related tax deductions to restrict their income
to ensure that they stay below the threshold. However, although sta-
tistically significant, these effects are empirically very small. While this
work does not directly test potential labour supply effects, it does
suggest very small behavioural responses to the Australian system.
Consequently, we regard using current participation rates as estimates
of future rates as appropriate.
As discussed in Section 2, emigration is also an important con-
sideration in the Irish context. Although Australia, New Zealand and
England have all introduced methods to encourage repayments by
emigrating graduates, we assume the worst case scenario – that emi-
grants make no payments while abroad. Based on the
Arslan et al. (2014) figure of 20% of Irish graduates living abroad cited
above, we assume that 10% emigrate permanently, while another 10%
are abroad in any given year, resulting in a probability of temporary
emigration of 0.1 each year. While the effect of living abroad for a year
is to delay repayments, a year of permanent emigration necessarily
causes lost repayments given our assumption of zero repayments by
emigrants. This assumption is a very conservative one. For example, in
the UK, the majority of EU students who go back overseas after grad-
uating – and who might reasonably be regarded as ‘permanent’ emi-
grants from the UK – do make repayments of their student loans; gov-
ernment figures indicate that repayments were being made as required
on about 57% of the outstanding loan balance.17
It is worth noting that we assume that the propensities to emigrate
and return migrate by graduates are unaffected by the introduction of
an income-contingent loan system. Although this may seem to be a
strong assumption, the limited evidence on graduate emigration sug-
gests that economic factors are not very important in such decisions.
15 To the extent that students graduate after three years, their loans will be
lower than €16,000 and the number of years of repayment will be corre-
spondingly lower, so these figures should be thought of as the worst case sce-
nario; the RBs faced by graduates under ICLs remain correct.
16 Note that the number of years of repayment is higher at the median than
for the 30th percentile, and the size of the repayments is correspondingly lower.
The reason for this apparently anomalous pattern is that the estimated median
age-earnings profile is relatively shallow after the repayment threshold of
€26,000 is reached, so the payments made are positive but relatively low during
the repayment years.
17 See Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2016, Student Loan
Repayment for Sustainable Higher Education: Joint Repayment Strategy,
paragraph 26.
B. Chapman and A. Doris Economics of Education Review 71 (2019) 109–119
115
For example, Gibson and McKenzie (2011) study the migration and
return migration decisions of top students in three Pacific Island nations
and conclude that economic incentives play a minor role in determining
which of the highly skilled migrate and return and which do not. This
suggests that loan repayments that reduce the effective wage rate would
not affect the migration or return migration decision.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5. The column for
the undiscounted repayment rates indicates that total repayment rates
remain high, even allowing for non-employment and emigration. The
ICL versions that entail positive real interest rates imply repayment
rates of 95 and 97% for schemes with repayments based on total and
marginal income respectively; for the schemes with a zero real interest
rate, repayments of 83% and 85% are predicted. However, because
many graduates do not reach the earnings threshold until several years
into their working lives, and because both non-employment and tem-
porary emigration entail further delays in repayments, discounted re-
payment rates are significantly lower, at 63–74%, implying a subsidy of
26–37% on the student contribution component of government
funding. These subsidy estimates are similar to those found by
Flannery and O'Donoghue (2011), using different data and ICL scheme
designs and a microsimulation approach.
It is important to recall that these estimated subsidy rates are based
on the strong assumption that graduates who emigrate – whether per-
manently or temporarily – make no repayments in the years that they
are abroad. If the question of how to encourage repayments by
emigrants can be addressed, subsidies will be lower than indicated by
the results shown in Table 5; a separate analysis, not reported here,
shows that if emigrants repaid fully, subsidy rates would be about 10
percentage points lower.
An overview of the results shown in Tables 3-5 indicates that the
schemes that include a non-zero real interest rate element are prefer-
able from the point of view of the government's fiscal position, since the
discounted repayments are higher for these schemes; of course, they are
less preferred by graduates for the same reason. The slight regressivity
of schemes with interest rates – at least in terms of undiscounted re-
payments – is an unattractive feature of these schemes, although dis-
counted repayments are progressive. However, for all of the ICL
schemes modelled, repayments are affordable and lie well below the
critical RB threshold of 18%.
6. Conclusions
This paper has assessed the feasibility of alternative student loan
schemes for the Irish case. This is a highly pertinent exercise for current
Irish higher education financing policy, for several reasons. First, ad-
ditional funding is needed for the higher education system as a result of
a severe fiscal crisis. Second, the same fiscal crisis has led to substantial
increases in taxes in recent years, which has led to strong political re-
sistance to higher education funding coming from further increases in
taxes. Finally, the measures taken during the crisis have been perceived
Table 3
ICL repayments for female employees, selected percentiles of the lifetime earnings distribution, various ICL specifications.
10th 20th 30th 50th 70th 80th
Panel A: 8% repayment rate on marginal income; 2% real interest rate when income above €26,000
% loan repaid 9.0 100 100 100 100 100
# years payment 14 26 17 12 12 11
Age final payment 55 53 43 36 33 31
Mean % net income 1.5 2.7 3.5 4.3 4.3 4.4
Mean monthly payment 35 69 92 127 127 137
Mean payment, 21–29 n/a 27 51 76 98 132
Total repayments 5854 21,456 18,853 18,247 18,353 18,054
Total, 2% discount 3099 13,126 13,388 13,929 14,782 15,077
All percentiles above the 15th repay in full.
Panel B: 8% repayment rate on marginal income; 0% real interest rate
% loan repaid 36.6 100 100 100 100 100
# years payment 14 23 15 11 11 10
Age final payment 55 50 41 35 32 30
Mean % net income 1.5 2.4 3.4 4.2 4.1 4.3
Mean monthly payment 35 58 89 121 121 133
Mean payment, 21–29 n/a 27 51 76 98 118
Total repayments 5854 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000
Total, 2% discount 3099 10,293 11,619 12,348 13,027 13,206
All percentiles above the 15th repay in full.
Panel C: 2–8% repayment rate on total income; 2% real interest rate when income above €26,000
% loan repaid 56.0 100 100 100 100 100
# years payment 14 19 11 9 9 8
Age final payment 55 46 37 33 30 28
Mean % net income 3.3 3.6 5.1 5.8 5.9 6.3
Mean monthly payment 73 84 134 162 163 182
Mean payment, 21–29 n/a 63 86 124 162 182
Total repayments 12,335 19,180 17,749 17,550 17,650 17,440
Total, 2% discount 6868 13,126 13,388 13,929 14,782 15,077
All percentiles above the 10th repay in full.
Panel D: 2–8% repayment rate on total income; 0% real interest rate
% loan repaid 77.1 100 100 100 100 100
# years payment 14 17 10 8 9 8
Age final payment 55 44 36 32 30 28
Mean % net income 3.3 3.4 5.1 6.1 5.4 5.9
Mean monthly payment 73 78 133 167 148 167
Mean payment, 21–29 n/a 63 86 124 162 167
Total repayments 12,335 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000
Total discounted by 2% 6868 11,270 12,167 12,773 13,480 13,896
All percentiles above the 10th repay in full.
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as affecting younger generations particularly badly, so the importance
of loan repayments being affordable is particularly strong.
We illustrate how alternative loan schemes might operate in prac-
tice in the Irish case. To do this, we first simulate life-cycle earnings
profiles for 19 points across the graduate earnings distribution, sepa-
rately for men and women, using unconditional quantile regression.
Simulations of the time pattern of repayments are then carried out, first
for alternative mortgage-type loan schemes with varying repayment
terms and loan amounts, followed by four alternative ICL schemes that
vary according to their interest rate regime and the basis on which
repayments are calculated.
The results for a mortgage-type loan confirm that, as in other
countries, RBs are adversely very high for men and women at the
bottom of the earnings distribution. Using a threshold of 18% of gross
income as the point at which hardship arises, we see that a substantial
proportion – and in some cases a majority – of Irish graduates would be
in difficulty with a mortgage-type loan in the early years following the
commencement of repayments.
Turning to the alternative ICL schemes, it is found that repayment
burdens are modest for all graduates, and particularly for low earners;
this of course is the result of ICL scheme design, which sets maximum
caps on RBs. We also find that the government subsidy varies sub-
stantially according to the design of the scheme that is chosen, with the
most important consideration being the choice of interest rate regime.
We model a scheme with an interest rate equal to the rate of inflation as
the baseline, but rising to a 2% real rate in years in which the earnings
threshold is reached. For this option, the government subsidy is 26%;
this figure is not very different to that found for Australia, and a lot
lower than is the case for England.
The analysis also highlights the importance of the policy treatment
of graduates who emigrate. Hypothetical calculations reveal that en-
couraging emigrants to repay their student loans will reduce the gov-
ernment subsidy by up to 10 percentage points. One approach to en-
couraging repayments by emigrants would be to involve the co-
operation of other governments in the collection of the debt. However,
this may not be politically feasible. Alternatively, as suggested by
Table 4
ICL repayments for male employees, selected percentiles of the lifetime earnings distribution, various ICL specifications.
Panel A: 8% repayment rate on marginal income; 2% real interest rate when income above €26,000
10th 20th 30th 50th 70th 80th
% loan repaid 100 100 100 100 100 100
# years payment 21 12 11 13 9 7
Age final payment 51 40 38 36 29 27
Mean % net income 3.1 4.3 4.4 4.0 5.2 6.0
Mean monthly payment 80 127 136 119 162 203
Mean payment, 21–29 n/a 17 43 60 162 203
Total repayments 20,227 18,231 17,993 18,637 17,492 17,014
Total discounted by 2% 12,369 12,868 13,126 14,208 15,077 15,077
All percentiles above the 5th repay in full
Panel B: 8% repayment rate on marginal income; 0% real interest rate
% loan repaid 100 100 100 100 100 100
# years payment 18 11 10 12 9 7
Age final payment 48 39 37 35 29 27
Mean % net income 2.9 4.2 4.4 3.8 4.8 5.7
Mean monthly payment 74 121 133 111 148 190
Mean payment, 21–29 n/a 17 43 60 148 190
Total repayments 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000
Total discounted by 2% 10,103 11,417 11,770 12,340 13,878 14,229
All percentiles above the 5th repay in full
Panel C: 2–8% Repayment rate on total income; 2% real interest rate when income above €26,000
% loan repaid 100 100 100 100 100 100
# years payment 15 9 8 10 7 5
Age final payment 45 37 35 33 27 25
Mean % net income 4.3 5.8 6.3 5.4 6.9 8.6
Mean monthly payment 104 162 182 149 202 276
Mean payment, 21–29 n/a 48 68 101 202 276
Total repayments 18,693 17,533 17,442 17,910 16,966 16,588
Total discounted by 2% 12,369 12,868 13,126 14,208 15,077 15,077
All percentiles above the 5th repay in full.
Panel D: 2–8% repayment rate on total income; 0% real interest rate
% loan repaid 100 100 100 100 100 100
# years payment 14 8 8 9 6 5
Age final payment 44 36 35 32 26 25
Mean % net income 4.0 6.0 5.8 5.5 7.6 8.3
Mean monthly payment 95 167 167 148 222 267
Mean payment, 21–29 n/a 48 68 101 222 267
Total repayments 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000 16,000
Total discounted by 2% 10,775 11,804 12,096 12,787 14,265 14,565
All percentiles above the 5th repay in full.
Table 5
Proportion of €16,000 repaid for alternative ICL repayment schemes, ac-
counting for employment and emigration patterns.
0% discount rate 2% discount rate
8% repayment of marginal income, 0%
real interest rate
0.83 0.63
8% repayment of marginal income, 2%
real interest rate
0.97 0.72
2–8% repayment of total income, 0% real
interest rate
0.85 0.67
2–8% repayment of total income, 2% real
interest rate
0.95 0.74
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Chapman and Higgins (2013) and now instituted in New Zealand, a
system can be designed that puts a legal obligation on a debtor going
overseas to repay a minimum amount of their obligation each year in
which they are away. The Australian government recently legislated an
obligation for ICL debtors to submit payments in line with their incomes
outside Australia, but it is too early to judge the success or otherwise of
this new arrangement.
The analysis reported here essentially reveals two critical points for
the Irish student loan policy debate. The first is that the use of a
mortgage-type loan, such as exists in the US and Canada, will be as-
sociated with significant repayment difficulties for many graduates, and
thus may lead to non-trivial levels of default. The second is that if de-
signed well, an ICL has considerable potential merit in addressing what
many would describe as a crisis in Irish higher education. Paying at-
tention to issues of interest rate subsidies and graduate emigration will
be critical.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Descriptive statistics for estimation sample.
Table A2
Female and male graduate employment rates, EU-SILC 2006.
Age Female graduate employment rate Male graduate employment rate
21 0.442 0.386
22 0.532 0.569
23 0.677 0.6
24 0.772 0.647
25 0.831 0.77
26 0.787 0.826
27 0.748 0.769
28 0.851 0.829
29 0.865 0.849
30 0.823 0.875
31 0.894 0.87
32 0.845 0.88
33 0.823 0.943
34 0.831 0.947
35 0.82 0.958
36 0.819 0.947
37 0.762 0.957
38 0.765 0.94
39 0.736 0.909
(continued on next page)
B. Chapman and A. Doris Economics of Education Review 71 (2019) 109–119
118
References
Amárach Consulting, (2015). Attitudes to higher education: A report prepared for the
expert group on future funding for higher education. http://www.hea.ie/sites/
default/files/focus_group_research.pdf.
Arslan, C., Dumont, J.-C., Kone, Z., Moullan, Y., Ozden, C., Parsons, C., et al. (2014). A
new profile of migrants in the aftermath of the recent economic crisis. OECD social, em-
ployment and migration. OECD Publishing. Working Papers, No. 160 http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/5jxt2t3nnjr5-en.
Barr, N. (2001). Government as piggy-bank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baum, S., & Schwartz, S. (2006). How much debt is too much? Defining benchmarks for
manageable student debt. New York: The College Board.
Borjas, G. J. (1985). Assimilation, changes in cohort quality, and the earnings of im-
migrants. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 3(4), 463–489.
Central Statistics Office. (2007). National employment survey 2006. Dublin: Stationery
Office.
Chapman, B. (2006). Income contingent loans for higher education: International re-
forms. In E. Hanushek, & F. Welch (Vol. Eds.), Handbook of the economics of education:
Vol. 2, (pp. 1435–1503). Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland.
Chapman, B., & Higgins, T. (2013). The costs of unpaid higher education contribution
scheme debts of graduates working abroad. Australian Economic Review, 46(3),
286–299.
Chapman, B., & Leigh, A. (2009). Do very high tax rates induce bunching? Implications
for the design of income contingent loan schemes. The Economic Record, 85(270),
276–289.
Chapman, B., & Liu, A. (2013). Repayment Burdens of Student loans of Vietnamese
Higher Education. Economics of Education Review, 37, 298–308.
Collins, M. (2016). Earnings and low pay in the Republic of Ireland. Journal of the
Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, XLV, 146–174.
Conefrey, T., & Smith, R. (2014). On the slide? Salary scales for new graduates 2004-
2012. Central Bank of Ireland Economic Letters Series, 2014(1).
Crawford, C., Crawford, R., & Jin, W. (2014). Estimating the public cost of student loans.
London: Institute for Fiscal Studies Report No. R94.
Denny, K. (2014). The effect of abolishing university tuition costs: Evidence from Ireland.
Labour Economics, 26, 26–33.
Doris, A., O'Neill, D., & Sweetman, O. (2015). Wage flexibility and the great recession:
The response of the Irish labour market. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, 4, 18.
European Commission. (2013). EU employment and social situation: Quarterly review June
2013. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
Expert Group on Future Funding for Higher Education. (2015). The role, value and scale
of higher education in Ireland. Consultation Paper 1 https://www.education.ie/en/
The-Education-System/Higher-Education/Higher-Education-Role-Value-and-Scale-
of-Higher-Education-in-Ireland-Discussion-Paper-1-.pdf.
Expert Group on Future Funding for Higher Education. (2016). Investing in national am-
bition: A strategy for funding higher education. Dublin: Department of Education and
Skills. http://www.education.ie/en/Publications/Policy-Reports/Investing-in-
National-Ambition-A-Strategy-for-Funding-Higher-Education.pdf.
Firpo, S., Fortin, N., & Lemieux, T. (2009). Unconditional quantile regressions.
Econometrica, 77(3), 953–973.
Flannery, D., & O'Donoghue, C. (2011). The life-cycle impact of alternative higher edu-
cation finance systems in Ireland. The Economic and Social Review, 42(3), 237–270.
Gibson, J., & McKenzie, D. (2011). The Microeconomic determinants of emigration and
return migration of the best and brightest: Evidence from the Pacific. Journal of
Development Economics, 95, 18–29.
HEA. (2008). What do graduates do? The class of 2006. Dublin: Higher Education
Authority.
HEA. (2014). What do graduates do? The class of 2013. Dublin: Higher Education
Authority.
HEA. (2015). What do graduates do? The class of 2014. Dublin: Higher Education
Authority.
HEA. (2017). What do graduates do? The class of 2015. Dublin: Higher Education
Authority.
McCoy, S., Calvert, E., Smyth, E., & Darmody, M. (2009). Study on the costs of participation
in higher education. Dublin: Higher Education Authority.
McGuinness, S., Bergin, A., & Whelan, A. (2015). A comparative time series analysis of over-
education in Europe: Is there a common policy approach? Brighton: University of
Brighton. STYLE Working Papers, WP 5.1. CROME http://www.style-research.eu/
publications/working-papers/.
Mooney, O., Patterson, V., O'Connor, M., & Chantler, A. (2010). A study of progression in
Irish higher education. Dublin: Higher Education Authority.
O'Connell, P., Clancy, D., & McCoy, S. (2006). Who went to college in 2004? A national
survey of new entrants to higher education. Dublin: Higher Education Authority.
OECD. (1997). Education at a glance. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
OECD. (1998). Education at a glance. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
OECD. (2016). Education at a glance. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
OECD. (2017). Education at a glance. Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development.
Shen, H., & Ziderman, A. (2009). Student loans repayment and recovery: International
comparisons. Higher Education, 57(3), 315–333.
Table A2 (continued)
Age Female graduate employment rate Male graduate employment rate
40 0.753 0.88
41 0.837 0.871
42 0.83 0.927
43 0.846 0.91
44 0.861 0.935
45 0.821 0.909
46 0.872 0.92
47 0.861 0.908
48 0.834 0.871
49 0.808 0.888
50 0.826 0.91
51 0.832 0.915
52 0.837 0.883
53 0.828 0.887
54 0.793 0.889
55 0.791 0.917
56 0.761 0.838
57 0.707 0.812
58 0.635 0.744
59 0.575 0.736
60 0.581 0.581
61 0.456 0.558
62 0.521 0.619
63 0.387 0.518
64 0.306 0.573
64 0.265 0.364
66 0.111 0.222
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